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Testing the Pecking Order Theory: Evidence from Chinese Listed 
Companies 
Jinlan Ni and Miaomiao Yu 
Department of Economics 
College of Business Administration 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
Omaha, NE 68182 
Abstract 
The pecking order theory of capital structure, which predicts that firms prefer 
internal to external finance, is one of the most influential theories of corporate 
leverage. This paper examines if the financial structure of China’s listed companies 
follows pecking order from debt to equity. Using the entire cross-section sample of 
China’s listed companies in 2004, we find no evidence that China’s listed companies 
follow the pecking order when they need funds to finance the investment projects. 
Further subgroup analyses indicate that big companies follow pecking order and 
small and medium companies do not. These results suggest that Chinese capital 
market is still under developing, however, the big companies face a relatively loose 
financing environment than the small ones.  
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1. Introduction 
How should firms finance their investment projects? Two competing theories offer the 
optimal capital structure for this financing decision: traditional (static) trade-off theory and 
pecking order theory. The former suggests that a value maximizing firm will pursue an 
optimal debt-to-value ratio by a tradeoff of the tax benefits of debt and the cost of financial 
distress. Marsh (1982) and Taggart (1977) provided evidence that firms adjust toward a target 
debt-to-value ratio. However, Myers (1984) argued that the poor fitness of econometric 
model and dramatically different actual debt ratios across similar firms make it plausible for 
the static tradeoff theory.  
Myers and Majlus (1984) proposed the second framework, the pecking order theory based 
on asymmetric information—managers have more inside information than the investors and 
act in favor of old shareholders. Their theory suggests that there is no optimal ratio and firms 
prefer debt to equity if external financing is required. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) 
further developed an empirical model that financial deficit should have a dollar-for-dollar 
impact on firm leverage if pecking order is followed. That is, one dollar increase in financial 
deficit leads to one dollar increase in a firm’s leverage. Using 157 firms that started at year 
1981 and survived through 1981- 1989 from Compustat data, they found strong evidence to 
support the pecking order predictions.1 
The purpose of this paper is to examine if Chinese listed companies follow the above 
pecking order theory in their financing decision. Using a unique sample of 407 listed Chinese 
companies at Shanghai Stock Exchange Center in year 2004, we find no evidence that the 
Chinese companies follow the pecking order theory. we further examine the pecking order 
theory in the narrow sets of firms. First, we focus on firms with the moderate debt ratio since 
Myers (1984) suggested that the modified pecking order theory is more suitable for 
                                                        
1 Chirinko and Singha (2000) put a critical comment on this paper. Their results indicated that Shyam-Sunder 
and Myers’ results can evaluate neither the Pecking Order nor Static Tradeoff Models. 
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companies with moderate debt ratio. The results indicate that the moderate debt ratio 
companies do not follow the pecking order either. Second, we break our sample by firm size 
(big, medium, and small) since small firms are expected to follow pecking order theory due 
to large information asymmetry. Contrary to the theory, our evidences show that only the big 
companies follow the pecking order. If the pecking order theory is correct, then the fact that 
the small and medium firms do not follow pecking order reflects the inefficient capital market 
in China. It is not surprising since Chinese economy is in a unique stage of both developing 
and transition economy. However, the big companies in China seem to have looser financing 
environment.  
 The above results are consistent with those in Frank and Goyal (2003).  Using a broad 
cross-section of publicly traded American firms over the period 1971-1998, Frank and Goyal 
(2003) showed that the financial deficit is an important factor of the corporate leverage, but 
there is no evidence to support the pecking order. Similarly, they did find that the financing 
behavior of the largest quartile firms in earlier years follow the pecking order when narrower 
samples of firms were considered. However, this support for the pecking order theory 
declines over time. They argued that Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) had a surviving bias 
led their small sample toward larger firms and thus did affect their conclusion.  
However, Chen and Zhao (2004) argued that Frank and Goyal’s results were driven by 
their large debt reduction firms. After studying the financial decisions of firms with different 
bankruptcy risks, they found a clear preference of debt over equity. They further found that 
the pecking order from debt to equity strengthens from low to medium bankruptcy risk firms. 
Similarly, Adrian Zoppa and Richard G. P. McMahon (2001) examined a panel of 871 
manufacturing Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) from the Australian survey data for 
three financial years from 1995-96 to 1997-98, and provided substantial empirical evidence 
supporting pecking order financing behavior amongst SMES.  
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Two papers have examined the capital structure of Chinese listed companies in the 
literature. Using a panel sample of 1200 Chinese listed companies from 1994 to 2003, Huang 
and Song (2006) investigated the determinants of the leverage of Chinese listed companies. 
They conjectured that the static trade-off model explains the capital structure of Chinese 
listed companies better than the pecking order hypothesis. 2 Conversely, Tong and Green 
(2005) found Chinese companies do follow pecking order using 47 listed Chinese companies. 
Different from the above models, we explain the difference of our results in that we use 
pecking order model originally from Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and they used the 
leverage model that indicates the determinant of leverage. To show this, we repeat their 
analysis and find the similar results that the leverage is determined by growth rate, company 
size, profitability and dividend. However, this does not indicate that the increase of fund 
deficit has the same proportion increase in the liability, which is what the pecking order 
model wants to investigate. Our paper fills this gap.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section introduces background of 
Chinese capital market. Section 3 introduces the data and methodology. Section 4 discusses 
the regression results. Conclusion follows in final section.  
 
2. Background of Chinese Capital Market 
China has a large capital supply after economic reform and development with more than 
twenty years. Figure 1 shows the national saving amount increased from 9,241.6 in 1991 to 
119,555.4 million Yuan in 20043. Chinese households used to and still have to save for 
prompt demand due to the underdeveloped social security system, increasing health care 
expenditures, increasing education expenditure and the costly real assets. The resulting high 
                                                        
2 However, Tong and Green (2005) pointed out that their methodology is not appropriate to draw such a 
conclusion. See more discussion at Tong and Green (2005) P. 2181.  
3 Data source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press, 2005. 
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savings imply the abundant external funding resources to Chinese listed companies. This is 
realized through three main financing channels: banking system, stock market, and corporate 
bond market.  
Chinese banking sectors were and continually have been the primary source of companies’ 
long-term debt in China (Bekier, 2005). There are big four state-owned commercial banks, 
which play the major roles in banking sector. As Hodgson (2004) pointed, they hold about 75 
percent of the total bank assets.  However, there exist many problems with the banking 
systems. First, the interest rates are still under control of Chinese central government due to 
past planed economy. Second, the banks established abnormal close relationship with 
companies based on non-profit reasons (called GuanXi).  Third, the existing huge amount of 
bad loans and lower profitability indicate their inefficient risk management. This largely 
limits the new companies’ financing channels. Finally, banks are much more cautious than 
ever in debt loan. They accept more short-term debt and mortgage loans. In 2004, the short-
term loans of financial institutions were 8,684.060 billions of Yuan, whereas the medium-
term and long-term loans are 7,670.290 billions of Yuan.4  
The alternative funding sources are the capital markets established and rapidly developed 
over one decade. In 1990, the first stock exchange center, Shanghai Stock Exchange, was 
established at metropolitan Shanghai, and Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established at 
Shenzhen in the following year. After more than ten years of development, the number of 
listed companies in 2004 reaches 1,3775, while the capital raised by stock is about 1,510.94 
millions of Yuan (issued share*issuing price). In order to meet the demand of foreign 
currencies for domestic companies, the government created a B share market in 1992. The 
participators of B share were limited to foreign investors before 2002. After that, B share 
                                                        
4 Data Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2005, China Statistics Press. 
Financial institutions include banks, savings deposit agencies of postal offices, housing saving banks, urban 
credit cooperative banks, rural credit cooperatives, urban credit banks, foreign-funded banks, financial trust 
investment agencies and financial companies etc. 
5 National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press, 2005. 
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market was opened to individual domestic citizens (Chien-Liang Chiu et al., 2005). In 2004, 
there were 86 companies issuing both A and B shares, and 24 companies issuing only B 
share6.   
Figure 2 shows the trend of funds raised by corporate bonds and shares from 1991 to 2004 
respectively. The data are from China Statistical Yearbook 1996-20057.  The shares include A 
Shares, Rights Issued, H&N Shares and B shares. Compared with corporate bond market, the 
stock market is rapidly developed.  As we can see from figure 2, the values of shares issued 
dramatically increase from 5 millions of Yuan in the year of1991 to 1,510.94 millions of Yuan 
in year 2004. Chinese government was introducing more market mechanism and relaxing the 
regulations gradually for the two stock exchanges. For example, Administrative Measures for 
Securities Issuance of Listed Companies (AMSILC) were issued by China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in 2006. The AMSILC states that one of the roles of CSRC 
is to act as the third party for supervision or even directly interfering with the securities trade.  
In contrast, the relatively flat curve of corporate bond indicates that the Chinese bond 
market is slowly developed. It is true that there exist many stimuli to the bond market reform, 
for example, the investment demand from insurance companies and foreign investors. 
However, the qualifications for the firms to issue bonds are very strict because of the absence 
of efficient credit rating systems. The complicated approval procedure in debt financing, 
quota control and the requirement of collateral significantly restrict the development of 
corporate bond market. Furthermore, Chinese companies’ opaque financial records defer the 
potential bond investors and impede the expansion of the bond market (Chen Ji and Stephen 
Thomas, 2005).  
In sum, the financing channels in China consist of the weak banking system, the 
                                                        
6 National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook, China Statistics Press, 2005. 
7 National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2005, China Statistics Press. 
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undeveloped corporate bond market and rapidly developed stock market in China. Our paper 
is trying to explore the financing structure of Chinese listed companies under current capital 
market. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
The dataset in this paper is manually collected from 2004 unconsolidated annual financial 
reports of 422 companies8 that are randomly selected from Shanghai Stock Exchange current 
listed companies. Of the 422 firms, six financial companies are excluded and four companies 
do not have enough information for the study. Furthermore, we drop 5 outliers with negative 
ownership equities. This leaves 407 listed companies for the empirical analysis.  
Our empirical model is similar to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) that is derived from the 
pecking order theory in Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). Assuming that firms can 
finance their projects by retained earnings, debt and equity, the pecking order theory predicts 
that firms will fund their projects using retained earnings first, then use debt if retained 
earnings are inadequate, and turn to the equity financing if they have to — no more debt 
available and costs of financial distress are high. According to the theory, the pecking order 
hypothesis is to test: 
                          i i iD DEF   = + +     (1) 
Where iD  denotes long term debt outstanding by firm i in Shyam-Sunder and Myers’s 
model. Because Chinese companies employ current liability rather than the long-term debt as 
the major means of debt financing, we define iD  as the change of total liability (i.e. total 
liability at the end of year t – total liability at start of year t). iDEF  is the flow of fund 
deficit defined as follows:  
                                                        
8 See data link at http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/datapresent.  
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 -i i i i iDEF DIV X W C= + +
9  
Where: 
iDIV
10: Cash payments for dividend, profit and interest for firm i , 
iC
11: Operating cash flow after taxes for firm i , 
 iX : Capital expenditure for firm i , is a summation of the amount of increase in long 
term investment, the amount of increase in fixed asset, and the amount of 
increase in intangible asset and other asset; the amount of increase is defined as 
“the amount at the end of year t minus the amount at start of year t”, 
iW : Increase in working capital, working capital is defined as the difference between 
liquid asset and current liability, i.e., working capital = liquid asset – current 
liability. 
 Table 1 summarizes the above variables. Following Tong and Green (2005), all the 
data are measured by book value based on the fact that the book values are more reliable in 
China. As we can see at Table 1, the average ratio of current liability to total liability ( RCT ) 
is about 84 percent for Chinese listed companies. The maximum ratio even reaches 100 
percent. It implies that Chinese listed companies hardly rely on long term liability to raise 
external funds. However, this differs by company size. At last three columns, we summarize 
the mean of all variables for small, medium and large sizes.  As we can see from the average 
ratio of current liability to total liability (RCT), the large firms rely more on long term debt 
                                                        
9 Note that Shyam-Sunder and Myers define  -i i i i i iDEF DIV X W R C= + +  +  where iR  is the current 
portion of long-term debt. According to the accounting definition and accounting data disclosure complying 
with the Chinese General Accepted Accounting Principles (CGAAP), the current portion of long-term debt ( iR ) 
is already contained in the working capital iW . Therefore, we do not include iR  as a separate component of 
iDEF  in our model to avoid double calculation.  
10   Instead of using cash dividends as Shyam-Sunder and Myers, we include profit and interest as well since the 
Chinese annual financial statement only provides a mixed item of Cash Payments for dividend, profit and 
interest. 
11 Shyam-Sunder and Myers define it as cash flows after interest and taxes. We exclude taxes only since the 
interest is part of iDIV . 
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than other two kinds of firms.  In addition, large firms pay more dividends (DIV) and have 
much more cash flows than small and medium companies (C). In particular, the capital 
expenditure (X) for large firms is much higher than the others. According to the definition of 
X, it implies that to some extent the large firms have more expenditure in long term 
investment projects or more investment in fixed assets. On the contrary, the negative X value 
for small firms means that many of them are in contraction.  
The regression analyses of model (1) are conducted in next section. If the firms’ capital 
structure follows the pecking order, then we expect to see that 0 =  and 1 = . In other 
words, the firm will tend to use debt to meet financing deficit, and equity issue or repurchase 
is treated as “last resort”. On the contrary, if   is close to 0, it implies that Chinese listed 
companies prefer equity rather than debt.  
 
4. Regression Results 
First, we conduct Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression on our 407 cross-sectional 
observations using the pecking order model (1). We then discuss our model by repeating 
leverage model used by Huang and Song (2006) and Tong and Green (2005). Doing this, we 
make our conclusion that Chinese listed companies do not follow pecking order theory.   
4.1 Pecking Order Model Regression 
We first conduct regression of model (1) to the entire sample. Then, we break the sample 
by debt ratios since Myers’ (1984) modified pecking order theory suggests that the firms with 
moderate leverage will follow the pecking order the best. Finally, we break the whole sample 
by company size. As Frank and Goyal (2003) suggested, the small firms confronting with 
relatively worse adverse selection problems should more likely match the pecking order 
predictions.  
We find no evidence that Chinese companies follow pecking order from our regression to 
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the entire sample.  As we can see at column (1) in Table 2, we find that the increase fund flow 
of deficits significantly increase the company new debts. However, the coefficient of iDEF  is 
rather low (0.152). We further test the joint hypothesis of pecking order that 0 =  and 1 = , 
the results of F-test indicate that the pecking order hypothesis is strongly rejected. Therefore, 
Chinese listed companies prone to equity issue when external funds are required. This 
compliments with the findings at Huang and Song (2006) that Tobin’s Q (the ratio of the 
market value of a firm's assets), a measurement of firms’ performance, for Chinese listed 
companies is extremely high. This implies that the stock values are excessively overestimated 
in China. According to the market timing theory, firms tend to issue more equity when their 
stocks are overestimated. Huang and Fung (2005) argued that a distinct characteristic 
between China’s stock market and other developed countries’ is that, in China, there exist 
nonfloatable shares that are held by the corporate controllers and can not be traded in either 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  The value of the nonfloatable shares 
is positively correlated with the market values of firm’s equity.12 In order to increase the 
expected value of nonfloatable shares, the firm controllers tend to issue maximum amount of 
equity. 
Second, our results show that firms with moderate debt ratio do not follow pecking order 
either. Following Frank and Goyal (2003), the moderate debt ratio group excludes the 
companies with either the top two deciles or the bottom two deciles debt ratios. As we can see 
from the column (2) in Table 2, the results for the moderate leverage companies are similar to 
those with the entire sample. Therefore, there is no any evidence to support pecking order 
among Chinese listed companies, even for the firms with the moderate debt ratio.  
Finally, we do find that the large Chinese companies follow pecking order. Table 3 
provides the regression results for small, medium and big companies. The coefficient for 
                                                        
12 See more discussions about liquidity premium and market-to-book ratio at Huang and Fung (2005).  
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small companies is not significant, while the coefficient for big companies is the highest 
(0.896) and significant at the 1 percent level. This is comparable with the results in Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999) for 157 companies (about 0.7) and Frank and Goyal (2003) for big 
companies (about 0.7). The F-tests of our joint hypothesis indicate that the big companies 
match well with the pecking order predictions. The results are consistent with Frank and 
Goyal (2003) that found only the big companies follow the pecking order but the entire 
sample (including the small ones) does not. This, however, contradicts the pecking order 
theory that the small firms will follow the best because small firms confront more serious 
asymmetric information than the big ones.  
Why, in general, Chinese listed companies do not follow the pecking order, but the large 
companies do? This may be due to the inefficient capital structure for the special stage of 
Chinese developing and transition economy. First, as we show at section 2, the bond market 
is slowly developed due to strict qualifications for the firms to issue bonds.  This leads to the 
results that only some excellent large firms can be approved to enter the corporate bond 
market, especially some large state-owned enterprises. The large state-owned companies 
which are protected by the government not only have advantages to access to the corporate 
bond market, but also could use government credit to obtain loans from commercial banks or 
other financial institutions. Second, the big four state-owned commercial banks still play the 
significant roles in banking sector as shown in section 2. However, they are not operated as 
efficient as they should be. The existing huge amount of bad loans and lower profitability 
make banks much more cautious than ever. The big companies with more fixed assets that 
could be used as collateral would be easier than small firms to acquire the debt from banks. 
Our conclusion contradicts with Tong and Green (2005), which claimed that Chinese 
companies follow pecking order using 44 companies. Tong and Green (2005) used a leverage 
determinant model that, in our point of view, deviates from the original testing model of 
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pecking order. The leverage model captures the determinants of leverage, but it does not 
capture the dollar-for-dollar relationship that indicates that a dollar increase in fund deficit 
increases one dollar of debt ratio. To show this, we will briefly introduce the leverage model 
and test the model to compare with pecking order model at next subsection. 
4.2 Leverage Model Regression 
The general leverage determinant model used to test the pecking order is given as follows: 
LEVi = SIZEi+ GROWTHi + DIVi + ROAi+ ei 
LEV  denotes the leverage, which is the ratio of total liability to total assets at the end of 
year. The SIZE in the model is measured by the natural logarithm of annual sales during the 
year following Huang and Song (2006). The variable GROWTH  is defined as the total assets 
book value at the end of the year divided by total assets at the beginning of the same year. 
DIV is the cash payments for dividend, profit and interest at the end of year scaled by mean 
value of total equity.  Profitability (ROA) in this study is measured by profits from operations 
divided by the mean value of total assets. The above variables are summarized in Table 4.  
The correlations of the above variables are presented at Table 5. We see that the leverage is 
positively correlated with company size, growth rate, and dividend, and negatively correlated 
with profitability. 
Table 6 reports the regression results. We conduct the leverage model using our 394 data, 
since 13 companies do not provide the sales data for unconsolidated accounts. Tong and 
Green (2005) conclude that the results tend to favor the pecking order theory based on the 
sign of coefficient for each variable in the model. We get the identical sign of coefficient for 
each factor in the model as Tong and Green (2005)’s:  The firms’ leverage is positively 
associated with company size, growth rate and dividend, and is negatively related with 
profitability.  However, this does not imply that an increase of flow of fund deficit has a 
proportional impact on new liability as pecking order indicated. In particular, we put the 
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following two comments to the impact of size and growth rate on the leverage in the 
following. 
First comment goes to the firm size and asymmetric information. Tong and Green (2005) 
argue that the larger firms with complex organization face the higher costs of information 
asymmetries. In this way, they insist that the positive relationship conforms to the pecking 
order theory. However, from original pecking order model assumption, the asymmetric 
information is defined as how much the outsiders (investors) know the insider information 
(firms).  Therefore, small firms have relatively more serious asymmetric information between 
firms and outside investors and thus should track pecking order more closely.13 Therefore, 
whether the positive relationship should be interpreted as supporting evidence for pecking 
order theory or not is a question. 
Second, the positive relationship between the asset growth rates and leverage may be not 
sufficient to prove the pecking order theory. Huang and Song (2006) point out that the firms 
with high growth rate in the past tend to have higher leverage, while firms with good 
investment opportunities in the future tend to have lower leverage.  It may be helpful to look 
across the firms with different growth rates using original pecking order model.14   
In summarize, leverage model does characterize that firm’s leverage is determined by firm 
size, growth rate, dividend and profitability. However, we do not find that the debt ratio 
increases proportionally with the fund deficit. Therefore, we cannot make a conclusion that 
Chinese listed companies follow pecking order.   
 
5. Conclusions and Implications 
We examine whether the Chinese listed companies’ financing decisions are consistent with 
                                                        
13 This is also confirmed by Frank and Goyal (2003). 
14 Frank and Goyal (2003) investigated this but found no evidence that firms with high growth rate follow 
pecking order.  
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the pecking order theory. Using a sample of 407 companies, we find no evidence that the 
capital structure of Chinese companies follows pecking order from retained earnings, debt to 
equity. Further, we find that the companies with the moderate debt ratios do not follow 
pecking order, which is against Myers (1984) that the companies with the moderate debt ratio 
will follow the pecking order the best. Finally, contrary to the implication of the pecking 
order theory that the small companies will follow the pecking order the best, our results 
indicate the opposite: big companies follow the pecking order while small and medium 
companies do not. 
These findings are generally not consistent with those of prior studies in the developed 
markets such as Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Chen and Zhao (2004), Zoppa and 
McMahon (2001).15 The main reason may be due to the imperfect Chinese capital market 
described in section 2. Simply speaking, the high entrance requirements of China’s corporate 
bond market make it impossible for the companies to finance by debt. The inefficiency of 
four state-owned commercial banks largely affects the companies’ finance decision. In 
addition, current economic laws are not fully developed to protect the minority shareholders. 
This makes the equity financing of the companies much more attractive in China. Therefore, 
it is necessary to have further reform of the banking system, development of corporate bond 
market and improvement of stock market to change the inefficient companies’ financing 
structure. As Franklin Allen et al. (2003) suggested, it would be wise to develop an 
appropriate reform pattern based on China’s existing financial system rather than simply copy 
other advanced countries’.  
 
 
 
                                                        
15 We have discussed the difference between our results and those undertaken by Tong and Green (2005) in 
previous section. 
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Tables: 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive of Variables 
(Unit: Billions of Chinese Yuan) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variable Means by Company 
Size 
      
Small 
companies 
Medium 
Companies 
Large 
Companies 
D  407 0.3977 2.82 -8.12 49.00 0.0193 0.1628 1.0156 
DEF  407 -0.2208 4.87 -89.60 17.20 -0.6601 0.0521 -0.0532 
X  407 0.26751 5.59 -89.50 63.10 -0.6115 0.1594 1.2620 
W  407 -0.1453 1.37 -23.40 3.16 -0.0076 -0.0413 -0.3887 
DIV  407 0.13978 0.67 -0.19 11.70 0.0199 0.0401 0.3610 
C  407 0.48284 2.42 -0.78 34.20 0.0609 0.1060 1.2875 
RCT  407 0.84377 0.19 0.06 1.00 0.8938 0.8618 0.7752 
 
Note:  
D = Total liability at the end of year t – total liability at start of year t. 
CWXDIVDEF −++= , where 
DIV : Cash Payments for dividend, profit and interest for each firm, 
:X  Capital expenditure, Capital expenditure of the firm = Increase in long term investment + 
Increase in fixed asset + Increase in intangible asset and other asset,  
W : Increase in working capital, working capital = liquid asset – current liability, 
 C : Operating cash flow after taxes for each firm. 
RCT :  Mean value of current liability / Mean value of total book liability. 
 
 
 
Whole Sample Moderate Leverage
DEF 0.152 0.134
(0.028)*** (0.033)***
Constant 0.004 0.005
(0.001)*** (0.002)**
Observations 407 244
R-squared 0.07 0.06
F =  937.06 F =  693.52
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2: Results of Pecking Order Model
Hypothesis: α=0 and β=1
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Whole Sample Small Companies Medium Companies Large Companies
DEF 0.152 0.001 0.383 0.896
(0.028)*** (0.001) (0.079)*** (0.093)***
Constant 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.011
(0.001)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.003)***
Observations 407 136 136 135
R-squared 0.07 0.01 0.15 0.41
F=  937.06 F = 5.8e+05 F = 60.98 F = 1.25
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.2665
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Hypothesis: α=0 and β=1
Table 3: Results of Pecking Order Model
 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LEV 407 0.40 0.19 0.01 0.97
SIZE 394 13.26 1.88 4.56 19.80
GROWTH 407 1.16 0.29 0.41 3.94
DIV 407 0.05 0.06 -0.14 0.76
ROA 407 0.04 0.07 -0.25 0.50
Table 4: Descriptive of Variables
 
Note: LEV = Total book liability at the end of 2004/ Total book assets at the end of 2004 
SIZE= Ln (Sales in 2004) 
GROWTH = Total book assets at the end of 2004 / Total book assets at the beginning of 2004 
DIV = Cash Payments for dividend, profit and interest at the end of 2004 / Mean value of total equity 
ROA = Profits from operations / Mean value of total book assets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEV SIZE GROWTH DIV ROA
LEV 1
SIZE 0.2506 1
GROWTH 0.2084 0.2706 1
DIV 0.4156 0.1802 0.0888 1
ROA -0.1556 0.4289 0.3754 0.058 1
Table 5: Correlation
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SIZE 0.028
(0.005)***
GROWTH 0.156
(0.029)***
DIV 1.091
(0.126)***
ROA -1.027
(0.126)***
Constant -0.161
(0.063)**
Observations 394
R-squared 0.34
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 6: Leverage Model
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Figure 1:  Savings Deposit in Urban and Rural Areas (Unit: 100M Yuan) 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. China Statistical Yearbook 1996-2005, China 
Statistics Press. 
Note:  
1. Raised Capital by Share includes A Shares, Rights Issued, H&N Shares and B shares. 
2. China Statistical Yearbook does not provide the data of corporate bond issue in 1999. We use the 
average number of the two adjacent numbers in 1998 and 2000 to approximate the corporate bond 
issue in 1999. 
 
Figure 2:  Funds Raised by Corporate Bond and Share (Unit: 100M Yuan) 
 
